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ing in the papers of Jean-Charles-Pierre Lenoir, the former lieutenantgeneral of police in Paris. Could the supreme idealist of the French Revolution have been a paid informant of the police during the mid-1780s?
I was not so naive as to take Lenoir's statement at face value, and I certainly felt no sympathy for the police as opposed to one of their most illustrious victims. But a disparity existed between the Brissot of the memoirs and the Brissot who appeared in all the manuscript sources. That disparity opened up a fissure in the Enlightenment-to-Revolution view of the eighteenth century that I had assimilated as an undergraduate in the 1950s, when high intellectual history was at its height. Would it be possible to strike out in a new direction, something that I liked to call "low intellectual history" but that promised to fare better under a less provocative name: the social history of ideas?
Social history was just beginning to undergo revival at that time; the pure history of ideas had become increasingly removed from the experience of ordinary human beings; and it seemed possible to look at the late Enlightenment as Edward Thompson, Eric Hobsbawn, George Rude, and Richard Cobb had examined the history of labor and popular protest, "from below." That phrase may sound archaic or overused today, and it may have been too programmatic in the 1960s, but it seemed to offer a way of getting out from under the great-men-greatbooks approach to intellectual life. Instead of merely studying philosophic texts, I wanted to see how the philosophes lived, day-to-day and terre a terre, within the social order of the Old Regime and to study how their ideas circulated within that society.
As a representative, would-be philosophe of the revolutionary generation, Brissot seemed to be an ideal case to study. He became a central figure in the doctoral dissertation I completed at Oxford in 1964, Trends in Radical Propaganda on the Eve of the French Revolution (unpublished but available from University Microfilm, Ann Arbor, Michigan). In fact, he became so central that I decided to write a biography of him and to produce an edition of his correspondence, which will eventually include nearly two hundred unpublished letters. Those two projects got shelved, however, while I worked on subjects that seemed more urgent, such as the history of books, intellectuals, and public opinion. But Brissot appears in many of those studies, and de Luna's essay provides an opportunity to go back over the question I raised twenty-two years ago: was Brissot a police spy? I believe he was. Can one convict him retrospectively of spying for the police? I think not. Let me explain.
Historians may sometimes act like detectives, and they can hardly avoid making judgments, but I do not see why they should behave like judges in a court of law. I did not pretend to convict Brissot of espionage, but rather to weigh all the evidence, pro and con, and then to advance an interpretation of my own-that is, to make out a case, not to pass sentence.
Many of Brissot's contemporaries accused him of having been a police spy, but their arguments generally struck me as tendentious: Rivarol was trying to blacken the reputation of revolutionaries in general, Gouy d'Arsy to smear the opponents of the slave trade, Franqois de Pange and Theodore Lameth to undercut the enemies of the reactionary right, Desmoulins to turn public opinion against the Girondins, Marat to wage a personal and political vendetta, Fran?ois Chabot and Anarcharsis Cloots to damn Brissot in the Jacobin Club, J.-B.-A. Amar to condemn the Girondins before the Committee of General Security, and Robespierre to overwhelm them in the Convention. I have sifted through all these accusations and have found most of them unconvincing. Marat's remarks, for example, should be taken seriously because he was a close friend of Brissot's before the Revolution. But he makes Brissot out to have been a spy for Lenoir in 1787, when Lenoir had ceased to be lieutenant-general of police. And Pange errs in the opposite way: he claims the spying took place in 1780, before Brissot had any financial need to work for Lenoir. The charges and countercharges do not add up to anything conclusive; they merely show that Brissot was widely suspected of spying and that his enemies slung a great deal of mud at him. I would never have expected to find a grain of truth in the mud had I not discovered the reference to Brissot's spying in the manuscript memoirs of Lenoir. But I never read Lenoir's papers uncritically. On the contrary, I stressed the importance of allowing for the obvious objection that, as a refugee from the Revolution, Lenoir had no love for revolutionaries. Because the documentation appears in my original article, I won't repeat it here. But because Lenoir's remark is so crucial to my argument, I will try to explain why I took it seriously. I propose to discuss: (1) the nature of the evidence in Lenoir's papers, (2) corroborating evidence, (3) counterevidence, and (4) circumstantial evidence.
On the historian as detective, see Carlo Ginzburg, Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method, trans. John and Anne C. Tedeschi (Baltimore, 1989). Curiously, after turning up evidence in one archive indicating that Brissot spied for the police, I found evidence in another, which proved that Marat had not stolen some valuables from the Ashmolean Museum in Oxford, contrary to the assertion of some of his biographers. Robert Darnton, "Marat n'a pas ete un voleur: Une Lettre inedite," Annales historiques de la Revolution fran(aise 185 (1966): 447-50.
1. Lenoir's manuscripts. There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of Lenoir's papers in the Bibliotheque municipale of Orleans. Georges Lefebvre, who first went through them, pronounced them genuine, and I found that they conform to many other police records that I have consulted. But they are not simple and straightforward documents. Along with some finished essays, copied neatly in a scribal hand, they contain all sorts of notes and scraps, some of which are nearly illegible. Lenoir drew on the notes in writing drafts for a work which he intended to publish as his memoirs. Nor does the possibility that Brissot worked for one of Lenoir's secretaries rather than for Lenoir himself. The lieutenant general of police in Paris was an important official, the equivalent in some respects of a mayor and a minister of the interior, and he presided over a large bureaucracy. He did not normally deal with the hack writers and journeyman printers who were hired as spies by his subordinates. But he read many of the spies' reports, and he sometimes forwarded the reports to the Keeper of the Seals or the minister in charge of the Maison du Roi. In weighing Lenoir's remarks, one must consider the contemporary concept of "police" and also of "spy," which were very different from our own. Anyone curious to know how the Paris police actually functioned can consult some eighteenth-century treatises.3 Anyone who has consulted the documents will find that Lenoir's remarks on Brissot, and indeed everything in Lenoir's papers, conform to the usage of the Old Regime. Nor do I claim that one should give an uncritical reading to the manuscripts Lenoir intended to publish as his memoirs. In my essay I stressed that Lenoir had plenty of reason to distort the past and to denigrate revolutionaries, because he wrote as an emigre at least fifteen years after the events he described. Are his memoirs less believable than Brissot's? Instead of pronouncing on the basis of the texts, I would recommend reading them with a great deal of skepticism and looking as hard as possible for evidence in other sources. De Luna has not found any new documentation. He merely disputes mine and accepts Brissot's writings at face value. The biographers of Brissot do not credit the story of his spying, it is true, but they did not know about the archival material that I turned up. In fact, it was only because I found so much new material, and so much that ran counter to Brissot's own account of his life, that I thought it worth writing another biography of him.7
Corroborating evidence. Who was the secretary or subordinate of Lenoir's who allegedly hired Brissot? We don't know. My best guess is a certain Martin (I can't discover his first name), who is identified in the
There is only one biography of Lenoir. It credits his integrity and cites a good deal of contemporary evidence to confirm his reputation as an honest civil servant, but of course it may be as biased in his favor as Brissot's biographies are in favor of Brissot.8 4. Circumstantial evidence. De Luna devotes nearly two-thirds of his essay to a survey of Brissot's philosophic writings. I do not disagree with his account of this well-known material, but I find its implications puzzling. He seems to argue that because Brissot wrote highminded works he could not have spied for the police. For my part, I think Brissot's philosophical writing demonstrates a sincere desire to become a philosophe and that his embastillement brought about the final collapse of that ambition. It condemned him to a life in Grub Street, although he continued to search for a way out-first by emigration to America, then by throwing himself into the French Revolution.
If one limits the inquiry to Brissot's printed works, it is clear that the Bastille disaster divides his writing into two main varieties: before it, he devoted himself primarily to treatises like the Theorie des lois criminelles and De la verite; afterwards, he wrote mainly pamphlets and journalism. That is not to say that Brissot did no pamphleteering before 1785 (I have identified two previously unknown early pamphlets of his that appeared anonymously), nor that he wrote nothing of a philosophic character after his release from the Bastille (his most important work, De la France et des Etats-Unis, was written with and subsidized by Claviere). It also does not vitiate Brissot's commitment to the antislavery movement and other noble causes. On the contrary, Brissot's campaigns for those causes seem all the more generous in that his own circumstances were so desperate. But his desperation forced him to live like a typical hack, making compromises and writing for money.
When the police released Brissot from the Bastille, he was ruined. He had lost the 4,000 to 5,000 livres that he had inherited from his father in the collapse of his London Lycee, and his partner in that enterprise, Desforges d'Hurecourt, was suing him for the 13,000 livres he had sunk into it. Meanwhile, Brissot's Swiss publisher, the Societe typographique de Neuchatel, was dunning him for a debt of 12,300 livres in printing expenses, and he had lost everything he owned, even the furniture in his London flat. To be sure, Brissot could delay paying Desforges while their dispute dragged on in court, and he could fob off the the Enlightenment, I think he can best be described as a hack. Hard words, but he had a hard lot. A bankrupt, would-be philosophe could not feed a family by publishing treatises on truth in the Paris of 1785. Brissot tried to make ends meet by writing pamphlets to manipulate the stock market for the benefit of his friend and patron, Etienne Claviere.
It would take a book to tell the full story of Brissot's financial pamphleteering, but I have summarized the main aspects of it in a recent article;'3 so I will be brief here. Claviere's papers in the Bibliotheque nationale show that he paid Brissot thousands of livres between 1785 and 1789. Most of the money probably helped Brissot meet his debts; some, paid out in sums of 200 or 300 livres every month or so, covered a portion of his living expenses; and some went for speculations on futures in shares of stock companies, which Claviere bought in Brissot's name, betting on a bear market. Meanwhile, Claviere put much larger sums, hundreds of thousands of livres, on his own bets, which took the form of marches a terme. He would contract to sell shares, which he did not own, at a high price on a future date. Expecting the value of the shares to drop, he would buy them at a low price just before that date and pocket the difference. The trick was to make sure that the value of the shares really did fall. Claviere did so by commissioning pamphlets.
He commissioned a dozen of them, from De la caisse d'escompte (1785) to Denonciation de l'agiotage (1787), and De la foi publique envers les creanciers de l'Etat (1788). Many carried Mirabeau's name on their title page, but most were written, in part or entirely, by Brissot. All of them attacked the assets of companies on which Claviere was speculating. In vehemently moralistic and even Rousseauistic language, they denounced conspiracies to inflate the value of the companies' stock; and so, by provoking a run on the stock, they fulfilled the strategy of the bear speculators. The struggle between the bears and bulls (baissiers and haussiers) remained purely financial until 1785, when it became concentrated on shares in the Compagnie des eaux. Etienne de Calonne, the Controller General, had a personal interest of 230,000 livres' worth of shares in the company, and he had secretly subsidized it with 1,200,000 livres from the royal treasury. More important, he was trying to avert a collapse of the stock market and of the state's finances in general, which teetered dangerously close to bankruptcy in 1786. Claviere had invested too much in rentes viageres to favor bankruptcy- What was the social reality behind the literary theme? To put the question in that fashion may be to distort the answer, for it implies that literature expresses some pre-existing social condition and that one can understand a text by locating the social determinants behind it. I don't think that procedure is adequate even for an understanding of financial pamphleteering. Certainly Claviere paid Brissot, and Brissot wrote pamphlets designed to bring down the value of stock in accordance with Claviere's speculations a la baisse. But Claviere and Brissot perceived the Bourse through a haze of Rousseaustic moralizing. In 1789, when he drafted his own version of a declaration of the rights of man, Claviere included the following clause: "As the conservation of morals is absolutely necessary for maintaining the social contract, all financial operations connected with the public service must be considered in relation to morality."'6 That was the main theme of the pam- this respect any more than I am arguing that literature derives directly from the organization of society. If I had to translate my research into theoretical propositions, I would describe literature in terms used by Pierre Bourdieu-as a "field" with a peculiar social organization and "symbolic goods" perpetually at stake in the struggle to establish dominant positions (the Voltairean as opposed to the Rousseauistic, for example).
But even that formulation smacks of reductionism. I don't think we have any theory that does justice to the complexities of literary life in eighteenth-century France. That is why I believe it is important to make a close study of cases like Brissot's. By pursuing leads in archives, one can carry the history of ideas beyond the boundaries set by printed texts. One can analyze the social conditions of authorship, the politics and economics of publishing, the diffusion and reception of ideas, the formation of public opinion, and many other phenomena that belong to what may be called the social history of ideas. The label doesn't matter, provided that it not be taken as a justification for ignoring the ideas themselves or for dismissing texts as products of a social system. How can one relate literary expression to social experience? That is what the argument is about, but it is an argument, a matter of finding and construing evidence, not an attempt to pass a moral verdict on a poor devil who died two centuries ago.
